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Feminist legal theorists, at least in this country, seem to be ob-
sessed with the concept of equality. Given the pre-eminence of the
equal protection clause in twentieth century constitutional litiga-
tion, this obsession is not surprising. One Australian feminist, after
observing that "equality" is similarly central to Anglo-Australian
jurisprudence, concluded that "the preoccupation with equality
has constituted an impediment to the development of feminist
theory."1
"Liberty" is another central concept in American jurisprudence.
The dominant political discourse, however, interprets liberty to
mean negative liberty. Thus, constitutional guarantees of liberty
mean only that the state shall leave individuals free from govern-
mental interference. Part of the feminist attraction to equality
stems from the possibility of interpreting equality to grant women
more substantive rights than those that can be derived from nega-
tive liberty.'
Despite its possibilities, the meaning of equality as a constitu-
tional norm has remained limited to the concept of formal equal-
ity.3 This limitation persists despite extensive feminist attempts to
* H.O. Head Centennial Professor in Real Property Law, University of Texas; A.B.. 1968,
Vassar College; J.D., 1973, University of Georgia. This Essay is an expanded version of the
Edith House Lecture I delivered at the University of Georgia School of Law in March 1990.
I would like to thank the Georgia students and faculty who engaged me in lively discussions
following the House Lecture and whose generous hospitality proved that sometimes you can
go home again. I am also indebted to the following colleagues for their extremely helpful
written comments on an earlier draft: Martha Chamallas, Karen Engle, Herbert
Hovenkamp, Jean Love, and Judith Resnik.
Margaret Thornton, Feminist Jurisprudence: Illusion or Reality?, 3 Ausm. J.L. & Soc'"
5, 11 (1986).
2 Cf. CATHARINE MACKINNONo FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987) (discussing privacy and
equality).
3 See Mary Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 169.
"Formal equality" requires courts to treat like cases alike. See infra notes 58-60 and accom-
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reconceptualize the meaning of equality.4 Feminists have not been
able to agree among themselves on a uniform core definition for
equality. The most notable debate has been between those femi-
nists who support the "equal treatment" concept (also known as
formal equality)" and those who support the "special treatment"
concept (also known as substantive equality).6 This debate has
centered on the question of pregnancy in the workplace and has
been primarily strategic-whether to stress the similarities be-
tween men and women (in order to gain support for pregnant
women) or whether (and when) to stress their differences (in order
to gain support for pregnant women). Because both equal treat-
ment and special treatment feminists agree that the workplace
should support pregnant women, their debate has been viewed as a
debate about means rather than ends.
Debates about the meaning of equality, however, can be debates
about "ends" or goals.7 As a goal, sex equality can mean a number
of different things. For example, some feminists might contemplate
an ideal, sex-equal world in which a person's sex is totally irrele-
vant to everyone.8 Other feminists might contemplate a world in
panying text (discussing the principle of formal equality).
' The feminist debate over the meaning of equality is reflected in the following articles:
Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of Maternity and the Work-
place Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Herma Kay, Equality and Difference: The
Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Equality and Difference];
Herma Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39; Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N.
Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning
of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513 (1983); Kathleen Lahey, Feminist
Theories of (In)Equality, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1987); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Wendy Williams, Notes from a First Generation,
1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 99 [hereinafter First Generation]; Wendy Williams, Equality's Rid-
dle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
5 See, e.g., Wendy Williams, First Generation, supra note 4.
' See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, supra note 4.
Some male scholars argue that equality is a goal in itself, a "fundamental human good,"
both instrumentally and intrinsically. E.g., KAI NIELSEN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 3 (1985); see
also David A.J. Richards, Justice and Equality, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 241 (1982). But see
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARe. L. REV. 537 (1982). For further discus-
sion of the debate over equality that followed Westen's article, see Kenneth Simons, Equal-
ity as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. REV. 387, 388-89 (1985).
8 If you have trouble imagining such a world, see JUNE ARNOLD, THE COOK AND THE CAR-
PENTER (1973), a work of fiction in which the author creates sexless pronouns so that the
reader is not apprised of the sex of the characters, thereby making sexual identity irrelevant
[Vol. 24:803804
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which a person's sex is irrelevant in public (meaning the- law
should take no notice), but not in private (meaning individuals
may prefer persons of one sex over another for certain personal
relationships). Still other feminists might contemplate a world in
which sex differences may sometimes be noticed by the law, but
only to assure other feminists' goals (for example, that child-bear-
ing be cost-free).
I believe our ability to conceptualize the ideal world is influ-
enced by the world in which we actually live. Thus, I am skeptical
of most utopian visions of sex-equal societies. I am particularly
skeptical if those visions are too fixed. If equality is to be viewed as
a goal, it must constantly be subject to revision. Nonetheless, we
need some vision of a better world, some idea of the ideal for
women. Equality may be part of the ideal. It may be an interim
step, or it may be a means to attaining other ideals.
How we move from this non-ideal world to the ideal one raises a
question of appropriate means.9 Which legal arguments we, as fem-
inists, choose to pursue ought to reflect our vision of the ideal.
This is true because the rhetoric we adopt helps to shape future
reality. Thus, to argue that pregnant women need special treat-
ment is to emphasize sex differences and to contribute thereby to a
reality in which sex is relevant, a reality which those who embrace
sex neutrality seek to change. I do not mean to suggest that femi-
nists who believe in sex neutrality as the ideal ought never to
adopt a sex-specific strategy. I mean only to suggest that such fem-
inists ought to consider the impact a sex-specific argument will
have on their long term goal.
This Essay is about the limits of equality for feminist legal the-
ory. Equality, like all concepts, is a social construct. Whether we
view equality as an ultimate goal of feminism, or merely as a useful
rhetorical device to help obtain other substantive goals, our cur-
rent use of the language of equality reflects the meanings that have
been constructed by a patriarchal society. In short, the rhetoric of
equality compares women to men. Women are either the same as
men or different, and in either case, men have set the standard.' 0
in the stories of their lives.
g Other scholars call this the problem of transition. See. e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Afar-
ket-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1875 (1987).
10 See generally CATHARINE MAcKINNON. TOWARD A FEhsNsT THiEORY OF THE STATE 215-
1990] 805
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They have also defined what it means to be a woman."
An important goal of feminist legal theory is to challenge and
change the male standard, to recreate reality from a woman-cen-
tered perspective. Debates about equality have unmasked the fact
of the male standard, but seem to me unlikely to change the stan-
dard. It is time to move beyond equality, which inevitably com-
pares women to men, and to focus on women themselves. To do
this is to embrace feminist goals that others have claimed are cen-
tral to the ultimate feminist project: self-definition"2 and self-
determination.'3
In this Essay, I will consider four schools of feminist thought:
liberal, radical, cultural and postmodern. My initial purpose is to
highlight and explain the disagreements over the meanings of
equality that have occurred among feminist legal scholars influ-
enced by these four schools of thought. I believe these disagree-
ments reflect real differences of opinion about how "woman' 1 4 is
currently defined by male power and how she should be defined by
feminists. In this event, feminist theory will be better served if we
refocus our energy from the debate about equality to a more direct
debate about the meaning of self-definition.
What does it mean to say that self-definition is a central goal for
34 (1989) [hereinafter TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY].
" "Man has said that woman can be defined, delineated, captured-understood, ex-
plained, and diagnosed-to a level of determination never accorded to man himself, who is
conceived as a rational animal with free will." Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus
Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405 (1988), reprinted
in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE AND PROCESS 295, 296 (Micheline Malson, Jean O'Barr,
Sarah Westphal-Wihl & Mary Wyer eds. 1989).
"[Male power] makes women (as it were) and so verifies (makes true) who women 'are' in
its view .... CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 10, at 122.
" "We need a new premise for society: that the most basic right of an individual is to
create the terms of its own definition." ANNE KOEDT, The Feminists: A Political Organiza-
tion to Annihilate Sex Roles, in RADICAL FEMINISM 368, 370 (1973), quoted in ALISON JAG-
GAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 86 (1983).
" "Radical feminism is working for the eradication of domination and elitism in all
human relationships. This would make self-determination the ultimate good and require the
downfall of society as we know it today." CELLESTINE WARE, WOMAN POWER: TIlE MOVEMENT
FOR WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1970), quoted in bell hooks, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO
CENTER 19 (1984).
" When I use "woman" in the singular, I mean to indicate a conceptual category that has
been idealized by the dominant discourse in western civilization. And although the atrib-
utes attached to this concept have been quite similar over long periods of time, I do not
mean to suggest that the category itself reflects reality nor that there is really only one
category.
[Vol. 24:803806
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feminism? At the least, for all feminists, it means rejecting male-
created definitions of "woman," definitions which have effectively
limited the possibilities of many individual women. Beyond this
initial shared premise, the questions become more difficult. If the
ideal is sex neutrality, perhaps the category "woman" ought to be
abandoned completely, allowing individual women to concentrate
on individual self-definitions. Yet, for many feminists, the category
"woman" is central to their analysis and critique of what is real for
women in the present. As such, it is a category that cannot yet be
abandoned. And for some feminists, the vision of the ideal includes
a vision of the ideal woman, a rejection of the male-defined cate-
gory replaced by a woman-defined category. But in this case, who
is to do the defining? Each individual woman for herself? Female
theorists on behalf of all women? Or, all women on behalf of all
women? These are not easy questions. In the succeeding sections
of this Essay, I hope to shed some light on these questions by sug-
gesting how different schools of feminist thought view the project
of self-definition. I will conclude with my own thoughts about the
importance of self-definition for feminism and offer some sugges-
tions for the role feminist legal theory should play in the project.
Part II of this Essay will discuss briefly the relationship between
self-definition and social construction that is central to my theme.
Part HI will describe the social construction of "woman" and
"equality" from an historical perspective. Part IV will outline the
various schools of feminist thought and describe their connections
to the concepts of equality and self-definition. Part V will conclude
with some thoughts about the future. Specifically, I will propose
that feminists in law concentrate on alternative legal argu-
ments-that is, arguments based not on equality, but on other con-
cepts that are better-tailored to accomplishment of the feminist
goal of self-definition.
I. SELF-DEFINITION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
Simone de Beauvoir said, "One is not born, rather one becomes,
a woman."' 15 One is, of course, born with particular biological sex
characteristics-(usually) either female or male.10 Simone de
'* SIMONE DE BE~uvoi, THE SECOND SEX 249 (H.M. Parshley trans. 1953).
'6
Sexual ambiguity can occur because female and male sexes are not discrete
1990]
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Beauvoir is not referring to biological sex characteristics when she
refers to the category "woman"; rather, she is referring to a socially
constructed category. What Simone de Beauvoir means is that one
constructs a female identity asione progresses through life, taking
on those characteristics that society deems appropriate for females.
At a general level, we might make a similar claim for all human
beings. One is born with the body of a human being. Yet, one be-
comes a person, a particular "self," as one lives one's life. The pro-
cess of becoming a male "self," however, is much different from the
process of becoming a "woman."
Feminists often rephrase Simone de Beauvoir's famous quote as
follows: "Women are not born, but made."'17 The difference in
phrasing is crucial to a feminist understanding of the problem of
self-identity and social construction. The rephrasing also conveys
an important critical point: while men become persons, women are
made. The difference is in the identification of the subject. Men
make themselves. They are subjects. But who makes women? Si-
mone de Beauvoir says that "woman" is the "other.""' She is
"other" to man and that makes her the object to man's
subjectivity.
Some modern social theorists claim that all categories of thought
are socially constructed.'" Thus, "woman" is a category just like
any other social category. Its content is provided by the creators of
social categories in the same way that those creators give content
to all categories. Feminists argue that it is men who have created
all the categories. Thus, it is men who have defined women. Or, to
put it another way, all social constructs, including "woman," are
products of a patriarchal society.2 0
phenomena, but rather a mosaic of factors. The various factors which can de-
termine the sex of an individual include gonadal sex, hormonal pattern, inter-
nal genitalia, external genitalia, primary and secondary sex characteristics..., o
sex assignment, psychological gender identity, and sex chromosome
constitution.
Karen Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New
Theory of Equality, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 205 n.14 (1985).
" Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, The Education of Women as Philosophers, 12 SIGNS 207
(1987), reprinted in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE AND PROCESS 35, 41 (Micheline Malson,
Jean O'Barr, Sarah Westphal-Wihl & Mary Wyer eds. 1989).
8 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 15, at 267-68.
" See, e.g., SONDRA FARGANIS, THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FEMININE ChIARACTER
40-41 (1986) (discussing Karl Mannheim); MICHEL FOUCAULT THE FOUCAULT READER (1984).
"0 Racial categories are also social constructs, constructed in this country by the dominant
[Vol. 24:803808
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Women feel the weight of this patriarchal definition. Let me de-
scribe a simple exercise that may help demonstrate this fact. Let
me ask you, the reader, to engage in this exercise right now.
Think about the way you define yourself to others. What words
would you choose to describe yourself? Pick three things about
yourself that you think are important. Ask your friends to do the
same. Notice how many of your female friends include "woman" in
their list of three. Compare this to how many of your male friends
include "man" in their list. Similarly, notice how many of your
friends list their racial or ethnic background. I would be surprised
if any of your white friends include race.
I realize this is not a precise social science experiment, but if
your results are at all similar to mine, then you will find that
women frequently define themselves as women (female, wife,
mother), whereas men rarely define themselves as men (male, hus-
band, father).2' Rather, men list their professional associations,
their athletic interests or accomplishments, their educational
achievements and myriad other things before "male." Why is that?
Think back to your own three choices. Did you choose these
three things about yourself because you independently thought
them to be most important? Or was your response to my question
affected by how society views you? Some brave, individualistic
souls may transcend the limits of society at times, but most people
define themselves in relation to others. As a general rule, what
others think about you cannot help but affect what you think
about yourself.
Women think of themselves as women because society has made
female status noticeable. In my own life, female status has pre-
vented me from being president of my high school class (only
males could be president), from having a paper route, from playing
organized sports, from wearing trousers to school or downtown
(only skirts were allowed by rule or by custom), from applying to
Harvard or Yale as an undergraduate, from joining certain clubs
and from being hired by certain law firms. My personal experience
tells me that being a woman is important. Female status has been
race, whites. White men are the subject to black men, as well as to black and white women,
all of whom are objects.
", Men with young children sometimes list "father" as an important category in their
lives. They certainly list "father" more often than they list "male" or "husband."
1990]
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determinative in too many cases for me not to have noticed.22
The curious point is that male status is also determinative. Be-
ing male is positive. It gets you things that being female does not.
If being male is so important, then why don't males feel the need
to describe themselves primarily as males? Why is it that maleness
goes unstated until someone gets it wrong? I suggest that the an-
swers to these questions may have something to do with male
subjectivity.
The point of my exercise is not only to suggest that men and
women view the import of their own gender differently. The exer-
cise also serves to demonstrate something about the process of self-
definition. Self-definition is affected by the society in which we live
as well as by our individual responses to that society. I can resist
being defined by others if I don't like those definitions, and my
resistance may enable me to build my own definitions. But my
very resistance results from, and is in reaction to, my dislike of
their definitions. Thus, I am likely to define myself in opposition
to that definition. If this is the case, then self-definition is never
something I can do independently.23
Feminists who wish to redefine the category "woman" are faced
with similar problems. As Linda Alcoff has said:
[E]very source of knowledge about women has been con-
taminated with misogyny and sexism. No matter where
we turn-to historical documents, philosophical construc-
tions, social scientific statistics, introspection, or daily
practices-the mediation of female bodies into construc-
tions of woman is dominated by misogynist discourse.
For feminists, who must transcend this discourse, it ap-
22 1 do not mean to suggest that female status is only determinative in a negative way. I
might, for example, point out that, being female enabled me to join the Girl Scouts and to
attend Vassar College in the 1960s. Although I may view these choices as positive, they
reflect their negative counterparts.
23 Because I believe we create our sense of self in relation to others, a totally independent
definition of self would never be possible. Ideally, however, the process of self-definition
would include active as well as reactive participation by women. When women resist the
limits of patriarchal definitions, their initial step may be reactive, but what follows can be
an autonomous act of creation. In an earlier article, I suggested that we have glimpses of our
own authenticity when we are able to free ourselves from the socially constructed category
"woman." Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERK,
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 194 n.10 (1990).
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pears we have nowhere to turn.2
In the following section, I will explore some of these sources of
knowledge about "woman."
Ill. THE CONSTRUCTION OF "WOMAN" AND "EQUALITY": GLIMPSES
FROM HISTORY
A. Introduction
"Throughout the history of women's struggles for emancipation,
analysts of the female condition have understood that prejudice
predetermines and perpetuates institutions of inequality as much
as institutions of inequality reflect and confirm prejudice."2"
Man's definition of "woman" is the result of prejudice. Whether
that prejudice is more accurately described as misogyny or misun-
derstanding, its effects are the same: the establishment of institu-
tions of inequality. Dismantling these institutions has been the im-
mediate project of much feminist litigation. So long as the
prejudice remains, however, the project will never be finished. And
whether the prejudice stems from misogyny or misunderstanding
(or something in-between) may well determine the possibilities for
ultimate success in eradicating inequality.
In this section, I will first sketch the concept of "woman" as it is
reflected in various historical sources. I have focused on sources
that are representative of our western tradition. They include
Christian doctrines and the teachings of influential Greek and Eu-
ropean philosophers. Legal decisionmakers of the late nineteenth
century who were asked to respond to feminist demands for equal-
ity were certainly familiar with many of these teachings. My review
of these sources is not intended as a complete history of western
thought, nor as a complete explanation of why male judges and
legislators viewed women as they did. My intent in this brief
sketch is to suggest a connection between the patriarchal definition
of women and the building of legal institutions of inequality.
I will then provide a similar sketch of the concept of "equality"
as it has been constructed by legal and political theorists in this
country. Although more recent theorists have suggested construc-
2 Linda Alcoff, supra note 11, at 295-96.
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, supra note 17, at 37.
1990]
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tions that may be at odds with classical liberalism, my discussion
focuses on "equality" as it has been constructed by liberal theo-
rists. I will proceed, in the following section, to examine various
feminist responses to the problems of inequality and male defini-
tions. These sketches of the construction of "woman" and "equal-
ity" will enrich that discussion.
B. The Construction of "Woman"
One early description of "woman" comes from the Bible. Eve,
the first woman, was created second, after Adam.28 She was created
out of his side, for the purpose of helping him. Many theorists
have built on this early story of creation to describe "woman" as
inferior to man.
Paul, for example, said that man should not cover his head when
he prays or prophesies for "he is the image and glory of God."27 By
contrast, "woman" should cover her head because "the woman is
the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman; but the
woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman,
but the woman for the man. '28
Augustine was troubled by the reference in Genesis to God's cre-
ation of both male and female in his image,2 9 and sought to explain
Paul's conclusion as follows: Man is in the image of God, and then
when "woman" joins him, she too is in the image of God. But when
she is alone, she is not in the image of God.30
26 There are actually two creation stories in Genesis. In the first chapter of Genesis, God
creates man, male and female, together. See infra note 29. Chapter 2 of Genesis, however,
tells a separate and different story about the creation of woman:
And the Lord God said, It is not good that the man should be alone; I will
make him a help meet for him.
And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and
he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof;
And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman,
and brought her unto the man.
Genesis 2:18, 21-22 (King James).
217 I Corinthians 11:7 (King James).
28 1 Corinthians 11:7-9 (King James).
The Jewish Bible does not require that either men or women cover their heads, Jewish
tradition, however, requires "men to cover the head as a sign of modesty before God, and
women, as evidence,of modesty before men .... ." 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1 (1971).
29 "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and
female created he them." Genesis 1:27 (King James).
30 See Augustine, The Trinity, in PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN 257 (Mary Briody Mahowald ed.
[Vol. 24:803
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Thomas Aquinas agreed that "woman" was made as man's
helper. But he clarified this point as follows: She is a helper only in
reproduction. Otherwise, man is better helped by another man.a
Aristotle said that women are less rational than men;32 that
whereas men are generators and creators, women are passive. In-
deed, Aristotle described "woman" as an "infertile male."33
Immanuel Kant, the father of modern rights theory, claimed
that men are the noble sex and women the beautiful sex. He ar-
gued that women have no sense of obligation. Thus, they are inca-
pable of acting in accord with moral duty. Women might do what
is right, but only because it appears beautiful to them. Man, by
contrast, will avoid evil because he has a duty to do what is right.
Men are capable of moral agency; women are not.
The virtue of a woman is a beautiful virtue. That of the
male sex should be a noble virtue. Women will avoid the
wicked not because it is unright, but because it is ugly;
and virtuous actions mean to them such as are morally
beautiful. Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, noth-
ing of obligation! Woman is intolerant of all commands
and all morose constraint. They do something only be-
cause it pleases them .... I hardly believe that the fair
34sex is capable of principles ....
Arthur Schopenhauer, a philosopher much influenced by Kant,
1983).
[Tihe woman together with her husband is the image of God, so that whole
substance is one image. But when she is assigned as a help-mate, a function
that pertains to her alone, then she is not the image of God; but as far as the
man is concerned, his is by himself alone the image of God.
Id. at 258.
31
It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a helper to
man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be
more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the
work of generation.
Thomas Aquinas, On the First Man, in PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN, supra note 30, at 276-77.
3 The claim that women are less rational than men has been echoed throughout the his.
tory of philosophy. See Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason, in WoaEN. KNOWLEDGE. AND
REALITY 111 (Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall eds. 1989).
3 Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, in PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN, supra note 30, at
266-67.
34 Immanuel Kant, Of the Distinction of the Beautiful and Sublime in the Interrelations
of the Two Sexes, in PHILOSPHY OF WoztAN, supra note 30, at 196.
8131990]
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said that "[w]omen are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and
teachers of our early childhood by the fact that they are them-
selves childish, frivolous and short-sighted. ' 35 In his view, women
were essentially immoral and irrational.36 They were also incapable
of truthfulness." Frederich Nietzsche shared Schopenhauer's view
of women as liars.38 Indeed, whatever the particular description of
woman's essence, most western philosophers make a point of defin-
ing her as lesser than "man" in her capabilities. 9
And according to Darwin, sex roles are biologically determined.
Males inherit male traits from their male ancestors and females
inherit female traits from their female ancestors. Since men have
had to fight other men for their female mates, "sexual selection
ha[s] resulted in men acquiring greater courage, perseverance, in-
telligence, and imagination than women."4 °
With the rise of commercial development in the 1800s, men in
this country left the home to work in the market economy, and
middle-class white women stayed home. Women were viewed as
the keepers of emotional and sentimental values, and writers began
to talk of "women's sphere." Feminist historians call this the era of
the making of a middle-class lady.4' Harriet Beecher Stowe ob-
served, "in no other country in the world can a woman without
much money, forced to do her own housework, be considered a
lady."42
Thus, by the late 1800s, the category "woman"-as understood
in this country to apply to white, heterosexual, middle-class
women-meant someone who was passive, emotional and loving,
not particularly intelligent, and whose most important role in life
15 Arthur Schopenhauer, On Women, in PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN, supra note 30, at 229.
11 "Hence it will be found that the fundamental fault of the female character is that it
has no sense of justice. This is mainly due to the fact ... that women are defective in the
powers of reasoning and deliberation." Id. at 231.
37 "[D]issimulation is innate in woman.... Therefore a woman who is perfectly truthful.
•. is perhaps an impossibility." Id. at 231.
"' "From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman
than truth-her great art is the lie .... ." Frederich Nietzsche, Our Virtues, in PHILOSOPIIY
OF WOMAN, supra note 30, at 74-75.
39 For a collection of these philosophers' views on "woman," see generally PHILOSOPIIY OF
WOMAN, supra note 30, and VISIONS OF WOMEN (Linda Bell ed. 1983).
40 MEN'S IDEAS/WOMEN'S REALITIES 4 (Louise Michele Newman ed. 1985).
4 CAROL HYMOwiTz & MICHAELE WEISSMAN, A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 64-75
(1978).
42 Id. at 68.
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was her reproductive one. This understanding of the category "wo-
man" led to laws justified by the need to protect her 3 and keep
her in her appropriate role as wife and mother. Until 1971, the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to sup-
port this "separate spheres" ideology.""
Of the laws that confined women to the private sphere, perhaps
the most well-known among legal scholars are those that banned
women from the practice of law.45 In the first constitutional chal-
lenge to such a law, Justice Bradley wrote in justifying the ban:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always rec-
ognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, wo-
man's protector and defender. The natural and proper ti-
midity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood ....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator."
At the Akron, Ohio Women's Rights Convention in 1851, Sojourner Truth, a former
slave, challenged the unstated racism in arguments that relied on the definition of woman as
weak, beautiful and in need of protection:
That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages and
lifted over ditches, and to have the best places everywhere. Nobody ever helps
me into carriages or over mud puddles, or gives me any best place. And ain't I
a woman? Look at me! I have ploughed and planted and gathered into barns
and no man could head me. And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and
eat as much as a man-when I could get it-and bear the lash as well. And
ain't I a woman?
Id. at 101.
" Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho probate law which
gave preference to men over women when appointing administrators to decedents' estates as
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
" See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232
(1875); Barbara Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: "First Woman," 30 ARtz. L Ray. 673
(1988)(describing in detail Foltz's challenge to California's exclusion of women from bar).
See generally KAREN BERGER MORELLO. THE INVISIBLE BAR 3-38 (1986).
" Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Myra Bradwell brought
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The constitutional challenge had been brought against the state
of Illinois by Myra Bradwell, publisher of the Chicago Legal News,
the most widely read legal newspaper in the Midwest. Bradwell
passed the bar exam in 1869, and when the State of Illinois denied
her application for admission to the bar, she appealed. 47 She ar-
gued before the United States Supreme Court that Illinois had de-
nied her privileges and immunities as a citizen under the four-
teenth amendment. She did not rely oni the equal protection clause
because, at the time, it was viewed as a provision available for race
discrimination claims only.48
Equality arguments on behalf of women came later.49 Prior to
the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed,50 most femi-
nist claims to equality were rejected in the courts. 1 These negative
decisions have been said to echo two dominant themes: (1)
Women's subordinate place in a world controlled by men is di-
vinely ordained; and (2) Differential treatment of the sexes is for
the benefit of women.52 Both of these themes endorsed male defini-
her claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court decided Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaugh-
ter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) [hereinafter the Slaughter-House Cases], just
before the Bradwell decision was handed down. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court
ruled that the privileges and immunities clause did not guarantee citizens a right to earn a
living as they chose. Justice Bradley, however, dissented. Having just concluded that the
privileges and immunities clause did cover a citizen's right to earn a living, Justice Bradley
had to rely on the law of the Creator to justify his holding against Myra Bradwell on the
same legal issue.
17 Myra Bradwell's story is told by Karen Berger Morello. See KAREN BERGER MORELLO,
supra note 45, at 14-21.
48
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will
ever be held to come within the purview of this [equal protection] provision, It
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.
11 E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); see
infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing Hoyt and Goesaert).
-- 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down on equal protection grounds an Idaho probate law
that mandated a preference for men over women in the court's selection of estate
administrators).
51 But see Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). In
Kirby, decided before Reed, the California Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting
women (other than owners or wives of owners) from tending bar.
52 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. ClN. L. Rav. 1, 2-8
(1975).
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tions of "woman" as less rational (not fit for public life), as beauti-
ful and weak (in need of male protection) and as fit only for roles
in the private sphere of home and family.
C. The Construction of "Equality"
The Bill of Rights was added to the United States Constitution
in order to ensure certain liberties to individuals against the fed-
eral government. None of these first ten amendments contained an
explicit guarantee of equality.53 Not until the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment did the principle of "equality" become an ex-
plicit constitutional principle.5 4 Nonetheless, as an ideal, "equal-
ity" has been part of America's political heritage since Thomas
Jefferson included the concept as a basic tenet in the Declaration
of Independence: "All men are created equal."""
Despite this early rhetorical commitment to "equality,"
America's history includes governmental recognition and support
for institutions of inequality. The institution of slavery is a prime
example. If Jefferson's declaration of equality was an accurate re-
flection of American political beliefs, how could that same Ameri-
can polity endorse the institution of slavery? How could that same
American polity restrict the right to vote to white male property
owners?
These questions can be answered once we understand how the
meaning of equality has been constructed by liberal legal theorists.
Although equality can have many different meanings,5o its meaning
in American jurisprudence has been restricted by liberal traditions.
In this section, I will discuss three different meanings of equality
that can be reconciled with dominant liberal ideology. Feminist at-
" "Equality before the law" as a political concept can be traced to the French Revolution
and the resulting Revolutionary Constitution. Equal rights arguments in the United States
did occur before the passage of the fourteenth amendment. See John Frank & Robert
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASIL U.LQ.
421, 434-37.
-' "No state shall ... deny... equal protection of the laws." US. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
The fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868. Most state constitutions also have an
equal protection clause (or some similar guarantee to equality). Although many of the state
provisions were adopted at the same time as the fourteenth amendment, some were adopted
much earlier. See John Frank & Robert Munro, supra note 53, at 438.
" The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
" See RICHARD HENRY TAWNEY, EQuALrTY 35 (1952) ("Equality possesses more than one
meaning.").
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tempts to reconstruct the meaning of equality have had to contend
with the fact that the law's predominant notions of equality are
linked to these liberal definitions. The three meanings of equality
that I will discuss are: (1) Equality as a principle of justice; (2)
Equality as a justification for representative government; and (3)
Equality as a distributive goal.
1. Equality as a Principle of Justice. As a principle of justice,
equality means that like cases ought to be treated alike. The corol-
lary is that unlike cases should be treated differently. 7 We can
trace this principle back to Aristotle. Institutions of inequality that
distinguish males from females, masters from slaves and the rulers
from the ruled are compatible with the Aristotelian notion of
equality: Males and females are not alike (nor are masters and
slaves, according to Aristotle). A major premise in Aristotle's Polit-
ics is that differences in ability to reason make some fit to rule and
others fit only to obey.58
To the extent American justice requires that like cases be
treated alike, the principle of equality serves as a check on biased
governmental action. If A has been treated in a certain way by the
government, then B must be treated similarly by the government if
B is indeed similar to A. If B is to be treated differently, perhaps
less favorably, government must explain why. We call this princi-
ple "formal equality" because it tells us nothing about the sub-
stance of how A and B ought to be treated." Indeed, the principle
of "formal equality" would be satisfied if A's more favorable treat-
ment were changed to correspond with B's less favorable
treatment.6
This principle of "formal equality" requires that comparisons be
57 See generally RICHARD HENRY TAWNEY, supra note 56; Peter Westen, supra note 7.
88 Aristotle's primary discussion of gender roles can be found in the Politics. For an excel-
lent discussion of Aristotle on this point, especially his division of the polls into free males,
women and slaves (what about slave women?), see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL Wo-
MAN 37-56 (1988).
89 See Peter Westen, supra note 7; Kenneth Simons, supra note 7.
'0 A prime illustration of the emptiness of "formal equality" is contained in the facts of
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The City of Jackson had operated certain public
swimming pools for the benefit of whites only. Rather than open these pools on an inte-
grated basis to African-Americans as well as whites, the city council elected to close the
pools. As a result, neither class of persons was entitled to the treatment afforded only white
persons prior to the decision. Nonetheless, the decision comports with "formal equality."
Both classes were being equally denied the use of the pools.
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made between classes of persons for whom we wish to obtain equal
treatment. Sex equality arguments based on this notion of equality
necessitate an emphasis on the similarities between men and
women. Because the Supreme Court's understanding of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment seems to be influ-
enced primarily by this Aristotelian notion of "formal equality,"61
feminist litigators relying on the fourteenth amendment have been
forced to argue that men and women are similarly situated.
Equal protection arguments were made in Goesaert v. Cleary,62 a
1948 case in which plaintiffs challenged a law allowing women to
tend bar only in taverns owned by their husbands or fathers, and
in Hoyt v. Florida,63 a 1961 action in which a female criminal de-
fendant challenged Florida's exclusion of females from juries. In
each of these cases, the claim of sex equality was rejected. Differ-
ential treatment of women was justified in the Court's view be-
cause women are different from men." The Supreme Court did not
apply the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
remedy a sex discrimination claim, until 1971.6 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court continues to rule against feminist claims to equal-
ity on the basis of women's difference from men. 6
Thus, this first meaning of equality-that likes be treated
alike-has helped determine the contours of feminist legal argu-
ment. Successful equality arguments require feminists to empha-
size the similarities between men and women and to minimize the
differences.17 Under the equal protection clause, this form of equal-
61 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341, 344 (1949).
62 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
368 U.S. 57 (1961).
" See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. at 465-66; Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. at 61-62.
" In that year, the Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, an Idaho probate law
which required courts to prefer men over women in the selection of estate administrators.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (deciding California statutory-rape
law applies only to males); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding military regis-
tration applies only to males); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (finding Florida property
tax exemption available only to widows).
I Woman's similarity to man was not always the basis for feminist legal argument. For
example, some early feminists argued that woman's greater capacity for empathy was a
strong justification for including women as jurors, along with men. See Susan Glaspell, A
Jury of Her Peers, reprinted in THE BEsT SHORT SToms OF 1917 256 (1918); Carol Weis-
brod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 70-79 (1986).
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ity can be described as the right to equal treatment.
2. Equality as a Justification for Representative Government.
When Thomas Jefferson proclaimed "all men are created equal,"
he probably meant to convey something more than the Aristotelian
principle that likes be treated alike. American political theory, af-
ter all, evolved more directly from the liberal theory espoused by
John Locke and John Stuart Mill than it did from the political
theory of Aristotle. The claim that all men are created equal sug-
gests, at the least, that an equal capacity for reason and passion is
shared by all human beings, a claim to which Aristotle did not
subscribe. s
Amy Gutmann, in setting forth the foundations of a liberal the-
ory of equality, formulates two. equality assumptions that she at-
tributes to the fathers of classical liberal thought.6 One assump-
tion she derives from the utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and James
Mill and the second she derives from the rationalists Immanuel
Kant and John Locke. The utilitarian equality assumption is that
human beings share similar passions. The rationalist equality as-
sumption is that human beings share a capacity for reason.
As Locke probably had more influence than other liberal theo-
rists on American political theory, I will concentrate on his equal-
ity arguments. Locke proclaims that all men are naturally in a
state of freedom as well as in a state of equality. He describes this
state of equality as one in which "all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another. 1' He then moves
from this descriptive statement to the following normative
principle:
[T]here being nothing more evident than that creatures
of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all
the same advantages of nature and the use of the same
faculties should also be equal one amongst another with-
out subordination or subjection ....
08 The Stoics, by contrast, argued against Aristotle's elitism that "the very possession of
the capacity to reason made men more alike than different." Sanford A. Lakoff, Christianity
and Equality, in IX NoMos 115, 118 (1967).
9 See AmY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 18-20 (1980).
" JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. II, para. 4 (T. Peardon ed.
1952).
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... The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it,
which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm an-
other in his life, health, liberty or possessions."1
Thus, for Locke, the belief in human equality entailed certain
normative principles regarding protection of life, health, liberty
and property. 72 Governmental action that resulted in the loss of
individual liberty could be justified to the extent it was necessary
to secure (equally) protection for individual life, health, liberty or
property. Note that this argument does not create an affirmative
obligation on the state to protect life, health, liberty or property.
Instead this argument merely justifies a minimum state, a state
that may (not must) sometimes interfere with individual liberty
when necessary to protect a limited class of individual interests:
life, health, liberty or property.
Furthermore, since the government derives its power from its
citizens, it can govern legitimately only so long as the citizens con-
sent to be governed. All citizens consent to potential governmental
restrictions on their individual liberty because they gain desired
security in their persons and their property. Since all consent, all
should have a say in what those potential restrictions may be. If
"all men are created equal," then all men should have an equal say
in government.
Equal representation was certainly a founding principle of
American government. But how can we reconcile this meaning of
equality with America's long-term denial of female suffrage? How
can the commitment to equal representation be reconciled with the
denial of public office to women? The most plausible explanation is
that woman's interests were believed capable of being adequately
represented by men. The social contract, consent of the governed,
and the running of government were all activities engaged in by
men on behalf of their families.73 Although Locke himself never
71 Id. at ch. II, para. 4, para. 6 (emphasis added).
72 Clearly, Locke's move from "is" to "ought" commits the naturalistic fallacy, but it is
not my intent to critique his form of argument. My intent is to describe the argument.
7- See SusAN MOLLER OKIN, JusTicE. GENDER AND THE FAxmy 8-10 (1989) (arguing that
modern liberal political theorists "continue to assume that the 'individual' who is the basic
subject of their theories is the male head of a fairly traditional household." Id. at 9.).
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explicitly says that only males are parties to the social contract, he
does argue that within the marriage relationship, the husband
should have the final say on matters that are of mutual concern to
husband and wife.74 From this, one can conclude that Locke
viewed the husband as the "family" representative to the social
contract.
7
Modern equal protection doctrine reflects the fact that women
have been excluded from the political process. Based on the now
famous footnote four of Carolene Products,76 process theorists ar-
gue that courts should scrutinize more closely legal rules that bur-
den women since women have not had sufficient access to the po-
litical arena to speak out on their own behalf. This "heightened
scrutiny" requires legislative bodies to give stronger justification
for laws which result in differential treatment on the basis of sex.
71
Requiring a stronger justification is reflective of the presumption
that all persons are entitled to equal treatment regardless of sex.
The requirement also serves to reduce the impact of earlier ine-
qualities (lack of access to legislative bodies) by affording women
stronger access to government via the courts.
To the extent the concept of equality means a right to equal rep-
resentation, it has helped feminists form equal protection argu-
ments asking for heightened'judicial scrutiny of legislative action.
The right to equal representation, however, has never been inter-
preted to require better representation of female interests in legis-
lative bodies. A prime example of the limited remedies available
74
But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet
having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different
wills, too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination-i.e., the
rule-should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man's share, as the
abler and the stronger.
JOHN LOCKE, supra note 70, at ch. VII, para. 82 (1952).
71 Locke did not believe that a husband had absolute authority over his wife within the
family sphere, but he did speak of the master of the family as someone who had "a very
distinct and differently limited power both as to time and extent over those several persons
that are in it"-wives, children, servants and slaves. Id. at para. 86. He never mentions
wives or women once he turns his attention away from "conjugal society" to "political
society."
7 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
7' Even stronger justifications are required for racial classifications, See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (applying
the compelling state interest test to racial classifications).
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under "equal representation" arguments is demonstrated in the
1979 Supreme Court decision, Personnel Administrator v. Fee-
ney.7" Massachusetts had enacted a veteran's preference bill, giving
job employment preferences to all veterans, ninety-eight percent of
whom happened to be male. Feminists argued that the legislation
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court upheld the legislation relying on the intent
requirement that the Court had recently clarified in Washington v.
Davis.7 e Under the intent requirement, a law would not be struck
down under the fourteenth amendment merely because its impact
fell more heavily on women. So long as the purpose of the law (to
benefit veterans) was nondiscriminatory (male and female veterans
would benefit), the law would stand.
The Massachusetts law at issue in Feeney was not subjected to
any sort of "heightened scrutiny." The right to "equal representa-
tion" that serves as a basis for "heightened scrutiny" in sex dis-
crimination cases was subverted by the Court's finding that the law
did not raise an issue of sex discrimination at all. And yet, if the
right to equal representation means anything, surely a state legisla-
ture that hands out benefits to veterans, but not to mothers or
homemakers, ought to be subject to some scrutiny.8"
3. Equality as a Distributive Goal. Often the concept of equality
is understood to refer to a principle of distributive justice that re-
quires the distribution of goods and services to be more equal. The
question of who is entitled to what goods has long been debated in
political philosophy. Aristotle, for example, argued as follows:
[J]ustice involves two factors-things, and the persons to
18 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
70 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
,o I do not mean to suggest that courts take over the legislative function in response to a
plaintiff's claim that the interests of women are being ignored by the legislature. Legislative
and judicial lawmaking powers are limited by our current notions of institutional compe-
tence. I do mean to raise the possibility that we rethink the notion of institutional compe-
tence. If courts are the proper body to protect women's rights to equal representation, then
something more than "footnote four" review is required to realize full protection. A discus-
sion of possible appropriate judicial remedies directed at legislative failures to respond to
woman's interests is beyond the scope of this article. It is a discussion that would challenge
current concepts of the way judicial and legislative power is divided and constructed. Such a
challenge from feminists would be appropriate. After all, those constructions did not come
from women. They were handed to us by the patriarchy. See CATHARINE MACKINNON. To-
WARD A FEMINIsT THEORY, supra note 10, at 237-39.
1990]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 823 1989-1990
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
whom things are assigned-and it considers that persons
who are equal should have assigned to them equal things.
But here there arises a question which must not be over-
looked. Equals and unequals-yes; but equals and une-
quals in what? This is a question which raises difficulties,
and involves us in philosophical speculation on politics."
Some liberal theorists would argue that distributive justice is
satisfied so long as goods and services are distributed according to
a merit principle. In answer to Aristotle's question, persons equal
in merit should receive equal distributions. Accompanying the
merit principle in liberal theory is the notion that every individual
ought to have an equal chance to establish merit. Together these
two principles form the equality theory adopted by most liberals:
equality of opportunity."2
Radical egalitarians argue that distributions ought to be more
equal in result, regardless of the merit principle. Some egalitarians
argue for a more limited "equality of results," focusing on equal
needs for basic necessities. Thus, for example, medical care and
housing are goods that ought to be distributed according to need
rather than merit.s3 John Rawls' theory can be interpreted as
partly egalitarian in that it requires not only equality of opportu-
nity, but also that "social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged."84
Equal opportunity has been the operative theory of equality in
American political action on behalf of women. Removal of explicit
barriers to opportunity was the first step. Equal protection doc-
trine reflects this understanding of equality, as does Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.85 However, meaningful equality of op-
portunity has been difficult to achieve given the long-term effects
of the operation of institutions built on inequality. 6 Substantive
81 ARISTOTLE, THE PorITICS OF ARISTOTLE 129 (Ernest Barker trans. 1958).
12 JAMES FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983).
"' See generally, Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 110 (1962), reprinted in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 116 (1971).
84 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971).
85 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
88 The family, for example, is one such institution. Sexual hierarchies continue to goner-
ate inequalities in families between husbands and wives and sons and daughters. Yet "equal
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legislative remedies have been pursued to reverse some of these
effects,87 but women still earn less than men, more women live be-
low the poverty level and child care and family responsibilities fall
more heavily on women."
In addition to legislative lobbying, feminists have fashioned sub-
stantive equality arguments in court battles as well, usually to no
avail.8 9 Equal protection doctrine in particular has not yet re-
sponded favorably to arguments based on the need to correct ex-
isting substantive inequalities between women's and men's mate-
rial conditions. This failure is not due to any logical inadequacies
in the concept of equality. Equality is capable of being understood
to require redistributions and substantive changes in material con-
ditions. The equal protection doctrine, however, carries with it
other fourteenth amendment doctrines that prevent a judge from
using equality rationales to justify substantial equalization of the
sexes. The state action doctrine and the intent requirement, for
example, limit the sorts of inequalities that judicial review can
reach. Furthermore, long-established notions of institutional com-
petence limit the sorts of remedies a court can fashion to correct
inequalities. If an employer refuses to hire a woman because he
fears she will miss work to attend to her children, a court can order
the employer to reverse the decision. But if a woman refuses the
job because its demands will not allow her to attend to children, a
court is not likely to afford her relief by ordering the employer to
provide on-site child care facilities. In both instances, the principle
opportunity" advocates have not generally argued for dismantling the family, or even cor-
recting the inequalities it produces. Fishkin makes a similar point about the family and
equal opportunity generally-not limited to the issue of sexual inequality. See JAmEs
FISHKIN, supra note 82.
Displaced homemaker, parental leave and child care bills are examples of specific sub-
stantive reforms. Specific reforms such as these have been less successful than more abstract
commitments to equality. President Bush recently vetoed legislation that would have cre-
ated job security for those parents who needed release time from work to attend to family
responsibilities.
" SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, supra note 73, at 3-4.
" Court battles over comparable worth are one such example. See American Fed'n of
State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Spauld-
ing v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
The abortion funding cases are another example. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), both holding that government can deny funding for
abortions even when it grants funding for other medical procedures and conditions, includ-
ing pregnancy.
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of equal opportunity is implicated, but remedies that would re-
quire significant changes in the workplace are thought of as legisla-
tive remedies, not judicial ones.9 °
To the extent feminists have preferred to fight for sexual equal-
ity in the courts rather than the legislatures, their equality argu-
ments have been limited by the socially constructed role of the ju-
diciary.9 1 Equality-of-result arguments, including egalitarian equal
opportunity arguments, have not been accepted by courts in the
absence of supportive legislation. Unless feminists can argue suc-
cessfully for a reconceptualization of the courts' role in issues of
distributive justice, egalitarian arguments ought to be directed pri-
marily at legislatures.
Feminists who pursue equality-of-result arguments will be faced
with the question that faces any egalitarian: what is the normative
principle for determining how goods and services ought to be dis-
tributed? Equality is not the answer, for the goal is not to achieve
equal distribution between men and women. Rather, the goal is to
achieve sufficient changes in the material conditions of women's
lives so that they can create themselves as freely and authentically
as men. Equality arguments are a means to that end. Egalitarian
equality arguments, in particular, can be used to support a redis-
tribution of goods and services that would ensure all persons a
minimum standard of living; for how can one create a "self" if one
is unduly burdened by lack of food and shelter?
" For an excellent discussion of the limitations of constitutional equality argument, soo
Judith Brown, Wendy Parmet & Phyllis Baumann, The Failure of Gender Equality: An
Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 573 (1987). The authors argue that
liberal interpretations of the Constitution focus on the individual's right to be free from
governmental intrusions. To the extent equality is understood to impose affirmative obliga-
tions on government (or the community), is at odds with prevailing constitutional jurispru-
dence. The authors further argue that this understanding of equality is so at odds with
liberal political thought that feminist appeals to legislatures will be viewed as pleas for spe-
cial treatment and a threat to the individualistic ethic. Id. at 633.
Title VII equality arguments are similarly limited by the individualistic ethic. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1988) (employer's failure to hire women in high-paying commission sales jobs hold to
result from women's individual choices). For an excellent explanation of how employers con-
tribute to the formation of women's job preferences and thus should be held liable under
Title VII, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpreta-
tions of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARy. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
91 See supra note 80.
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IV. SCHOOLS OF FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE BATTLE OVER
EQUALITY
A. Background
Equality as justice relies on the notion of similar treatment for
those who are similarly situated. Although America was founded
on principles of equality and freedom, sex equality was not part of
the original understanding of the founders. At that time, socially
constructed gender roles placed men and women into different sit-
uations. Men were expected to occupy the public sphere of busi-
ness and commerce. Women were to occupy the private sphere of
home and family. Sex equality, meaning similar treatment, simply
made no sense in a world of such separate spheres.
Nineteenth century feminists challenged this separate spheres
ideology, declaring "all men and women are created equal" and
that every woman has the right to "occupy ... such a station in
society as her conscience shall dictate."92 Reactions to this appeal
ranged from ridicule (Who are these women? ... old maids?)93 to
lighter sexist humor.94 Although some progress was made through
legislative channels,95 early judicial responses to feminist equality
92 Seneca Falls Convention, Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, reprinted in
PAULA ROTHENBERG, RACISM AND SEXISM 192 (1988).
93 "Who are these women? What do they want? ... Some of them are old maids, whose
personal charms were never very attractive, and who have been sadly slighted by the mascu-
line gender in general; some of them women who have been badly mated .... Editorial,
The Woman's Rights Convention-The Last Act of the Drama, N.Y. Herald, Sept. 12, 1852,
reprinted in PAULA ROTHENBERG, supra note 92, at 196.
91 In response to a petition for sexual equality, the Judiciary Committee of the New York
State Legislature reported as follows:
iT]he ladies always have the best place and choicest tidbit at the table. They
have the best seat in the cars, carriages, and sleighs; the warmest place in the
winter, and the coolest place in the summer. They have their choice on which
side of the bed they will lie, front or back. A lady's dress costs three times as
much as that of a gentleman; and, at the present time, with the prevailing
fashion, one lady occupies three times as much space in the world as a
gentleman.
It thus appeared ... that, if there is any inequality or oppression in the case,
the gentlemen are the sufferers. They, however, have presented no petitions for
redress; having, doubtless, made up their minds to yield to an inevitable
destiny.. 
Id. at 197-98.
" Married Women's Property Acts, for example, were passed in many states in the last
part of the nineteenth century, enabling married women to own property. See DEBoRAHI
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 24-26 (1989). And the Illinois legislature removed the gender
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claims accepted the separate spheres ideology and reinforced the
male-constructed definition of "woman." Thus, the battle for sex
equality was, in part, a battle over who had the right to define((woman."
When the second wave of feminism revived the claim to sexual
equality in the 1960s, the definition of "woman" as different from
man remained a stumbling block. Thus, feminist litigation of the
1960s and 1970s began with an attack on the definition of "wo-
man," arguing against laws that restricted female access to the
public sphere. The arguments were framed in equality terms. Spe-
cifically, the arguments were for equal treatment and equal oppor-
tunity. Equality arguments of this sort were necessarily relational
or comparative 6 Equal treatment compared with whom? The an-
swer, of course: compared with men. Thus, these early equality ar-
guments focused on the similarities between women and men. The
concept of equality at the core of these arguments became known
as "formal equality."'97
Problems arose, however, in those cases in which there was no
clear similarity between women and men. The most obvious exam-
ples of problem cases were those involving pregnancy in the work-
place."' A split occurred in the feminist community over these
cases and over the meaning of equality. Some feminists remained
committed to the notion of formal equality and argued that preg-
nancy should be treated just like any other temporary disability.
These feminists were characterized as the "equal treatment"
camp.9 Other feminists argued that we ought to embrace a notion
of equality that recognizes the uniqueness of pregnancy. These
restriction for Bar membership shortly before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
the Bradwell case. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing Bradwel).
Congress passed similar legislation to enable women to practice law in the United States
Supreme Court. See RICHARD CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 277
(1988).
" See Kenneth Simons, supra note 7, at 387.
9 The concept of formal equality, as opposed to substantive equality, has also been at the
center of much race discrimination litigation under the equal protection clause. See, e.g.,
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing city swimming pools to all residents in
response to integration requirements did not violate equal protection). See also supra note
60 (discussing Palmer).
11 See, e.g., General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (interpreting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (interpreting equal protec-
tion clause of fourteenth amendment).
9 See, e.g., Wendy Williams, First Generation, supra note 4.
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feminists were characterized as the "special treatment" camp.'
The debate over "equal treatment" versus "special treatment"
focuses on how differences between men and women ought to be
regarded by the law. It is precisely this equality debate that led me
at the beginning of this Essay to observe that American feminists
seem obsessed with the concept of equality. The equality debate
necessarily breaks down into subarguments over how women are
similar to men and how they are different from men. Thus, femi-
nist arguments over equality necessarily entail arguments about
the definition of "woman." In the following part of this section, I
will focus on how different schools of feminist thought perceive the
category "woman" and the importance of those perceptions on the
meaning of equality.
B. Schools of Feminist Thought: Perspectives on "Woman" and
"Equality"
1. Liberal Feminism. Liberal feminism is rooted in the belief
that women, as well as men, are rights-bearing, autonomous human
beings. Rationality, individual choice, equal rights and equal op-
portunity are central concepts for liberal political theory. Liberal
feminism, building on these concepts, argues that women are just
as rational as men and that women should have equal opportunity
with men to exercise their right to make rational, self-interested
choices. Early liberal feminists include Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-
1799) and Harriet Taylor."0 '
Today, liberal feminism is often associated with Betty Friedan
and other founders of the National Organization of Women.
Within the legal academy, it is a term associated with Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Herma Hill Kay, Wendy Williams and Nadine Taub.
Liberal feminism is viewed as the dominant theory behind much of
the post-Reed v. Reed constitutional litigation brought on behalf of
women. 102 This litigation was spearheaded by Ruth Bader Gins-
"* See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, supra note 4.
101 Harriet Taylor co-authored a number of important works with John Stuart Mill. See
HARRIET TAYLOR & JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869), HARIET TAYLOR
& JOHN STUART MILL, ENFRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN (1851); HA.RIET TAYLOR & JOHN STU-
ART MILL, EARLY ESSAYS ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1832). Taylor and Mill eventually mar-
ried each other after the death of Taylor's husband. See ROSEMARIE TONG. F", ansr
THOUGHT 13-22 (1989).
102 See supra note 65 (discussing Reed v. Reed).
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burg, who was then a Professor of Law at Rutgers and subse-
quently at Columbia University. The post-Reed litigation included
Frontiero v. Richardson,'10 3 a Supreme Court decision in which four
Justices declared sex to be a suspect classification entitled to the
same strict scrutiny as race. The sex classification in Frontiero pre-
sumed that wives, but not husbands, were dependent for purposes
of computing military benefits.
Another key case was Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.10 4 Stephen
Wiesenfeld's wife, Paula, was a math teacher, an employee covered
by social security. When she died in childbirth, Stephen applied
for social security benefits for himself and their infant son. Only
benefits for the infant son were awarded. Although a woman in
Stephen's situation could have received benefits as long'as she was
not working, such benefits-designed to enable the mother to stay
home with her child-were not available to a man. Stephen, who
planned to care for his infant son himself, challenged the gender
classification and won. A majority of the Justices saw this primar-
ily as an equal pay case involving discrimination against female
employees (in this case Stephen's wife), who were denied family
benefits that were available to male employees. At the same time,
the Court recognized that the challenged classification was based
on a stereotype that assumed only women wished to be caring
parents.'0 5
Liberal feminists have been criticized by more radical feminists
for being concerned only with equal pay in the public sphere. Liti-
gators, like Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have been charged as being
short-sighted because they adopted an assimilationist theory of
equality that would benefit women only if they acted like men.100
Let me spell out the critique a bit further. Remember that
103 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
10' 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
103 Id. at 652-53.
106 Some feminists additionally criticize this early equality litigation because it included
cases like Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which men successfully argued for rights
held by women: in Craig, the right to buy 3.2% beer. See Debra Ratterman, Liberating
Feminist Jurisprudence, in OFF OUR BACKS 12 (1990). Such criticisms seem misplaced to
me. First of all, Ginsburg did not initiate the litigation in Craig v. Boren and did not view it
as a central part of her litigation strategy. Furthermore, all of these cases were used by
feminist litigators to educate the Justices about the danger of sexual stereotyping in general.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal
Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. Cm. LEG L F. 9, 17.
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equality theory, as applied to gender, has been conceptually lim-
ited by the "similarly situated" requirement. If members of the
dominant gender (men) enjoy rights that members of the nondomi-
nant gender (women) want, then the only way for women to obtain
these rights under existing equal protection doctrine is to argue
that, as to the right in question, women are similarly situated to
men. If men are being paid X dollars for performing a job in the
public sphere, then women should be entitled to the same pay for
performing the same job. The equality argument is that women are
workers just like men. It is this argument of similarity that makes
it possible to expand women's rights. Radical feminists complain,
however, that to argue on the basis of women's similarity to men
merely assimilates women into an unchanged male sphere. In a
sense, the result is to make women into men.
The liberal feminist response to this is that early feminist litiga-
tion was concerned with breaking down male-created categories.
The point was not to make women into men, but to expand the
possibilities for female life-experience by freeing women from the
limitations of the male-constructed category "woman." "Woman"
was to be freed from the private domestic sphere, if she so chose.
The radical feminist rejoinder is: Yes, but on whose terms? The
workplace remains male-constructed. The category "worker" is
male-constructed. To force women from one male-constructed cat-
egory to another is not a real victory, especially if the newly con-
structed female worker adopts the existing patriarchal view of the
world.107
Wherever one comes out on this particular debate between lib-
eral and radical feminists, it is important to understand both sides.
Both sides agree that women should not be limited by male-con-
structed categories. Their disagreement is over which categories
are most worthy of challenge. At this level, the disagreement is po-
litical and instrumental. The disagreement becomes substantive,
however, when we shift the focus to the question of what should
take the place of the male-constructed category "woman." Radical
feminists fear that arguments couched in equal protection terms
107 Martha Minow tells of a similar problem involving high-school girls, who, after being
admitted to previously all-male Central High in Philadelphia, along with their male cohorts
began to "look down upon the girls enrolled at Girl's High." Martha Minow, Beyond
Universality, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 115, 127-28.
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alleging the similarity between women and men may ultimately be
harmful because such arguments endorse entrenched patriarchal
values. The new category "woman" that emerges from such argu-
ments is still male-constructed. This concern is valid. But if radical
feminists think that liberal feminist legal scholars do not share this
concern, they are mistaken.
As Wendy Williams, a liberal feminist, has recently explained,
the problem with the presently constructed sex categories, male
and female, is that they are defined as "discontinuous complemen-
tary poles." 10 8 Furthermore, the problem with antidiscrimination
law is that it
requires that we be female or male ... before it will ex-
tend its protection .... Thus discontinuity and comple-
mentarity are the prerequisites to remedies under the an-
tidiscrimination laws: A person must be one sex,
maintain the appearance (in clothing and effect) of that
sex, and prefer sex with the 'opposite' sex. If a person has
complied with the requirement that he or she be properly
'sexed,' the law will then provide partial protection
against penalties for being of a sex."0 "
Williams does not embrace the law's definition of "woman"
when she argues that a woman (as defined by the law) is the victim
of sex discrimination. Yet, as much as she may be troubled by the
the law's construction of "woman," she is willing to use that con-
struction to prevent even narrower definitions from limiting the
possibilities of real women in the world today.
2. Radical Feminism. Radical feminism is not easily defined be-
cause it takes many forms. For my purposes, it will be sufficient to
contrast radical feminist thought with liberal feminist thought.
First, whereas liberal feminists emphasize the individual (men and
women as individual human beings), radical feminists focus on
women as a class, typically as a class that is dominated by another
class known as men. Second, whereas liberal feminist equality ar-
guments are based primarily on the similarities between men and
women," 0 radical feminists tend to build arguments that focus on
Wendy Williams, First Generation, supra note 4, at 105.
Id. at 105-06 n.16.
110 Yet some liberal feminists do argue that biological differences such as pregnancy ought
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the differences between men and women. These differences, argue
radical feminists, have been constructed in such a way as to con-
tribute to women's inequality.
Radical feminists in the legal academy include Catharine MacK-
innon and Christine Littleton. Littleton has argued for a recon-
structed concept of sexual equality which would recognize woman's
difference from man.' She calls her model "equality as accept-
ance." 2 To "accept" woman's difference, society must do some-
thing more than merely accommodate the difference. I interpret
Littleton's "equality as acceptance" thesis to require the centrali-
zation of "woman" (her identity, her specificity, her difference
from man) in normative debates about how the world ought to be
structured. Consider the current dilemma over pregnancy in the
workplace. If women had participated equally in designing the
workplace from the beginning, employers would not be asked to
make accommodations for pregnancy. Instead, the workplace
would have been structured so that pregnant workers were not
viewed as different from the norm. To move from the male-
modeled workplace that currently exists to one that fully accepts
women will require some fundamental changes in the model itself.
We will have achieved "equality as acceptance" only when wo-
man's difference from man is costless. 113
Catharine MacKinnon argues that because men have defined
women as different, equality arguments cannot succeed.
Put another way, gender is socially constructed as differ-
ence epistemologically; sex discrimination law bounds
gender equality by difference doctrinally. A built-in ten-
sion exists between this concept of equality, which pre-
to be accounted for in equality arguments. That is, some liberal feminists join the "special
treatment" camp on the issue of pregnancy. See Herma Kay, Equality and Difference,
supra note 4.
" Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 4.
12 Id. at 1312-13. I endorse the rhetoric of "acceptance" as opposed to "accommodation"
because "equality as accommodation" keeps man at the center and woman at the margin.
However, I confess some difficulty in imagining what specific policies might constitute "ac-
ceptance" rather than "accommodation." Since we begin with a male model of just about
everything, any improvement in that model strikes me as accommodation rather than ac-
ceptance. Full acceptance would require rebuilding the model from scratch with women par-
ticipating equally in the rebuilding. I doubt we can move directly from a male model that
excludes the female to one that fully accepts the female.
"I See id. at 1323-35.
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supposes sameness, and this concept of sex, which pre-
supposes difference. Sex equality thus becomes a
contradiction in terms, something of an oxymoron, which
may suggest why we are having such a difficult time get-
ting it."'
Recognizing that women as a class are different from men as the
two sexes have been socially constructed, MacKinnon would aban-
don liberal equality arguments. In MacKinnon's view, "an equality
question is a question of the distribution of power." 11 The most
important difference between women and men is the difference in
power. Men dominate women. Men take from women. Further-
more, men have been in control for so long that legal discourse
completely ignores the reality of women's lives. Thus, equality the-
ory, as a legal discourse, has focused on public sphere issues like
pregnancy in the workplace-issues of import in male lives-rather
than focusing on those long-silenced parts of female experience
such as rape and other forms of sexual assault.116
Using the rhetoric of domination and sexual subordination in-
stead of equality, radical feminists in the MacKinnon camp argue
for changes in laws that will end the inequality in power. Sex
equality, in this view, affirmatively requires protecting women
from such things as sexual harassment, rape and battering by men.
An extension of this theory is used to justify a ban on pornography
because pornography is thought to contribute to women's sexual
subordination.
Some liberal feminists question parts of the radical feminist
agenda on grounds that special protections for women often lead to
inequality. The most serious disagreement between liberal and
radical feminists is over pornography. Radical feminists, especially
MacKinnon, support laws that will suppress pornography."1 Por-
nography, in their view, is male-created, and defines "woman" as a
sexual object. Liberal feminists agree that most pornography is
male-created and that male-created pornography defines "woman"
114 CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2, at 32-33.
Id. at 40.
"' "These experiences have been silenced out of the difference definition of sex equality
largely because they happen almost exclusively to women. Understand: for this reason, they
are considered not to raise sex equality issues." Id. at 41.
" See id. at 175-95 (discussing anti-pornography legislation MacKinnon supports).
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as a sexual object.11 But, argue liberal feminists, to allow the state
to ban pornography is to give the state power to define acceptable
sex. Since the current state is a creature of male power, there is no
reason to believe the state will define acceptable sex in a way that
is consistent with an individual woman's own definition of her sex-
ual self.119 In the pornography debate, the radical feminists' reli-
ance on equality theory as a class-based theory (pornography con-
tributes to woman's inequality) clashes with the liberal feminists'
commitment to individual liberty.
Some liberal feminists120 (as well as postmodern feminists) also
challenge the radical feminists' emphasis on "woman" as a class.
They argue that radical feminists fail to take account of the many
differences among women, focusing only on how all women are dif-
ferent from men. To focus on "woman" as a unitary category is to
define her in some essential way, to claim that all women are alike
in some essential way.
Radical feminists respond to this challenge by denying the exis-
tence of a female essence. Radical feminists embrace totally the
claim that women are socially constructed.121 They do not believe
that by deconstructing her we will find some underlying true es-
sence. Rather they believe that by challenging the male construc-
tion of the category "woman," we can begin to construct our own
category. We may not be able to free ourselves from socially con-
structed categories, but a woman-defined "woman" is at least an
improvement over the present state of affairs.
3. Cultural Feminism. Cultural feminists, 22 like radical femi-
"' Some liberal feminists worry, however, that laws used to suppress pornography %ill be
used first against the less powerful members of society who produce pornography, specifi-
cally lesbians, who are attempting to create erotic images of women free from male-defined
"woman-as-sexual-object" imagery.
19 Indeed, there is no reason to believe that MacKinnon's view of acceptable sex is some-
thing that all women would embrace. See Lucinda Finley, The Nature of Domination and
the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U.L REv. 352, 382
(1988).
1 0 E.g., Wendy Williams, First Generation, supra note 4, at 107-08.
121 CATHARINE MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIsT THEORY, supra note 10, at 109.
122 Although I am carving out cultural feminists as a separate category from radical femi-
nists, the categories are not so easily divided as my taxonomy may suggest. Cultural femi-
nism, as I use the phrase, is often described as relational feminism; that is, feminists who
focus on women's relationships. Although I cite to both Martha Fineman and Robin West as
examples of legal theorists who are cultural feminists, there are significant differences be-
tween these two. Fineman, for example, is clear that women's relationships are socially con-
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nists, focus on woman's difference from man. Cultural feminists,
however, unlike their radical sisters, embrace woman's difference.
Carol Gilligan, for example, argues that women, because of their
different life experiences, speak in a "different voice" from their
male counterparts.123 Gilligan identifies the female voice with car-
ing and relationships. Woman's moral vision encompasses this dif-
ferent voice. Woman's difference is good.
Feminists in the Gilligan camp are interested in changing insti-
tutions to give equal weight to woman's moral voice. They argue
that the category "woman" has not been so much misdefined by
men, as it has been ignored and undervalued. Yes, women are nur-
turing. Yes, women value personal relationships. These attributes
are to be valued. Using equality rhetoric, cultural feminists argue
for material changes in present conditions that would support wo-
man-valued relationships.
Martha Fineman, for example, has argued for a concept of
equality that recognizes and values the special relationship be-
tween mother and child. 124 Similarly, Robin West has charged that
all modern legal theory is "masculine" because it is based on a
view of human beings as primarily distinct and unconnected to
each other. A properly constructed feminist jurisprudence would
reflect the reality of women's lives-their essential
connectedness." 5
I have defined cultural feminism to include feminists who
ascribe fully to the social construction thesis. In such cases, the
only difference between radical and cultural feminists is that radi-
cal feminists have chosen to emphasize in their theory a negative
structed. They are part of what is and law ought to protect these relationships because
failure to do so causes real harm to existing women. Whether these relationships ought to be
preserved in their current form is a separate question. West's views, by contrast, tend to-
wards biological determinism. Women's relationships occur because of woman's nature. For
West, woman's nature is not only what is, but forms the basis for what ought to be. Thus,
according to West, we ought to build legal theories to protect these relationships because
these relationships are good. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing
Martha Fineman's and Robin West's conception of equality).
123 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
" Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988) [hereinafter Dominant Dis-
course]; Martha Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction, and Social
Change; A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Di-
vorce, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789 [hereinafter Implementing Equality].
25 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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aspect of "woman"-her sexual objectification-whereas, cultural
feminists emphasize a positive aspect-her special bond to
others.12 6 Because their emphasis is different, radical and cultural
feminists may contribute differently to the project of self-
definition." 7
Some cultural feminists, however, can be understood to support
the concept that "woman," although currently constructed in a
certain way, has a discoverable natural essence.12 8 Whether viewed
as natural or socially constructed, woman's capacity for caring and
connection has provided substance for an interesting debate be-
tween radical feminist MacKinnon and cultural feminist Gilligan.
Gilligan's work encourages us to value woman's view of herself and
the world around her. MacKinnon, however, is suspicious of this
"different voice." This voice, after all, has been constructed in re-
sponse to the patriarchy. For those who subscribe to the social con-
struction thesis, the voice is just another voice of the patriarchy.
Alternatively, if there is such a thing as a natural or authentic "wo-
man," how can we know that this is her voice? MacKinnon argues
that until women cease to be victims of subordination they cannot
speak for themselves.12
This argument has a certain Catch-22 effect. Woman-identified
"z' Although feminists in law tend to concentrate on the special bond between mother
and child, other feminist theorists focus on the special bonds between adult women. See,
e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY (1978); AUDRE LORD. SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); ADmsEs
RICH, ON LIEs, SECRETS AND SILENCE (1979).
127 Radical feminists can fight against the sexual objectification of woman without inten-
tionally creating a positive concept of woman as sexual subject. And cultural feminists can
fight to protect woman's special bond to others without intentionally adopting the definition
of "woman" as archetypical nurturer. Yet, in both cases, legal arguments produce rhetoric
that shape our future reality. Some forms of feminist argument may reshape our concept of
men more than our concept of "woman." I have in mind MacKinnon's arguments that men
have all the power and that men abuse women.
'2 I understand Robin West to take that position. Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social
Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 59, 84-96. Ruth Colker's search for the authentic
self may be interpreted by some as a search for the pre-social, natural self, but I do not
understand her that way. Since she equates authentic-self with aspirational-sef. she appears
to contemplate a dynamic feminist creation of self (in society), rather than a discovery of a
pre-existing self. Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compas-
sion, and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1020 n.35 (1989) [hereinafter Feminism, Theol-
ogy, and Abortion].
129 CATHARINE MAcKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2, at 39. See also Ellen
DuBois, Mary Dunlap, Carol Gilligan, Catharine MacKinnon & Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Feminist Discourse: Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L REv. 11, 74
(1985).
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values, such as caring and connection to others, are suspect be-
cause they are values that women have created in response to the
patriarchy. We value caring because that is what our oppressors
have caused us to value (because we define ourselves in relation to
our oppressors, we aren't really engaging in self-definition). But if
all women are victims of the patriarchy, how can any woman ever
claim knowledge of what is truly in woman's best interest? How
can we know that any equality arguments will further the best in-
terests of women?
There must be some way to free ourselves sufficiently from the
patriarchy to engage in the project of self-definition. Feminist the-
orists outside the field of law have argued in favor of separatism at
least as an interim step in creating a woman-defined "woman."' 130
But legal theorists have been obsessed with equality, a concept
which is inconsistent with separatism. 31
4. Postmodern Feminism. Postmodern feminists eschew the idea
of unitary truth, of objective reality. They readily admit that cate-
gories, especially gender categories, are mere social constructs.
Equality, too, is a social construct. It is true that these constructs,
as products of the patriarchy, are in need of a feminist reconstruc-
tion. But postmodern feminism tells us to beware of searching for
a new truth to replace the old. There simply is no such thing as the
essential "woman." There is no such thing as the woman's point of
view. There is no single theory of equality that will work for the
benefit of all women. Indeed, there is probably no single change or
goal that is in the best interest of all women.
Some would argue that the concept "postmodern feminism" is
an oxymoron. It is a phrase that combines two con-
cepts-postmodernism and feminism-that cannot logically coex-
ist. For if postmodernism views the category "woman" as being so
multifarious that it denies unitariness, how can it ever ascribe to
be feminist, since feminism is a theory that focuses on the unitary
category "woman"?
130 See, e.g., Radicalesbians, The Woman Identified Woman, reprinted in FoR LESBIANS
ONLY: A SEPARATIST ANTHOLOGY 17 (Sarah L. Hoagland & Julia Penelope eds. 1988);
Marilyn Frye, Some Reflections on Separatism and Power, reprinted in FOIR LESBIANS
ONLY: A SEPARATIST ANTHOLOGY, supra.
"' But see Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 128 (arguing that
feminist theology and the concept of authentic self can help us bridge the gap between
social construction and self-definition).
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My own answer to this supposed conundrum is that postmodern
feminism does not focus on the category "woman." Rather, it fo-
cuses on the situated realities of women, plural. Postmodern femi-
nists question earlier feminist attempts to redefine the category
"woman." Any definition, even one articulated by feminists, is lim-
iting and serves to "tie the individual to her identity as a wo-
man. 1 32 Furthermore, feminists who support any single definition
of "woman" are viewed by postmodernists as tending toward
essentialism. 133
One need not embrace postmodernism completely to criticize the
tendency toward essentialism found in radical and cultural femi-
nist writings. Wendy Williams, usually viewed as a liberal feminist,
has raised concerns about the homogeneity of certain feminist con-
cepts of "woman. 1 1 34 Similarly, Angela Harris has argued that the
meta-theories of gender constructed by Catharine MacKinnon and
Robin West rely on a concept of "woman" that has been ab-
stracted from the experience of white women.' 35 I have made a
similar claim that the "woman" constructed by these theorists also
appears to be heterosexual.' If feminists are fighting for maxi-
mum liberation, then equality arguments and theories aimed pri-
marily at white heterosexual women will not accomplish that task.
At the same time, postmodern thought poses a certain dilemma.
Any theory requires some degree of abstraction and generalization.
Thus, if feminists embrace the particular situated realities of all
individual women, plural, we will find it difficult to build a theory,
singular, to combat oppression. As to the category "woman,"
postmodernism suggests that it is a fiction, a non-determinable
identity. Linda Alcoff complains that whereas feminist definitions
of "woman" tend toward essentialism, postmodernism tends to-
ward nominalism.1 7
I am reluctant to classify any feminist theorists within the legal
academy as purely postmodern, although a number of such schol-
Linda Alcoff, supra note 11, at 305.
133 Id.
114 Williams, First Generation, supra note 4.
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L RE%. 581
(1990).
Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BER&. Wo s'S
L.J. 191 (1989-90).
"I Linda Alcoff, supra note 11, at 307.
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ars do incorporate postmodern themes in their writing. For exam-
ple, strains of postmodern thought can be found in the critical
feminist legal scholarship of Frances Olsen1 38 and Deborah
Rhode.1 39 Both Katharine Bartlett and Martha Minow have fo-
cused on the importance of multiple perspectives in the construc-
tion of reality.140 Margaret Jane Radin, in writing about feminism
and pragmatism, echoes the postmodern feminist's rejection of ab-
stract universal theory in favor of practical solutions to concrete
situations. 14
1
Within the legal academy, the feminist theorists most closely al-
igned with postmodern feminism is Drucilla Cornell. Building on
the work of deconstructionist Jacques Derrida and the psychoana-
lytic theories of Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, Cornell shows
us how we might reconstruct "woman" without resorting to essen-
tialism or unitary concepts. She names her brand of feminism
"ethical feminism" and contrasts it with liberal and radical femi-
nism." 2 Rather than deriving what "woman" ought to be from the
reality of what is, Cornell encourages us to create, with the help of
allegory and myth, an "imaginative universal, 1 43 a mythology of
the feminine in which all women can find themselves.44 This ap-
M See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 453, 458 (David
Kairys ed. 1990); Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style (Book Review), 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1147, 1169-77 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 2) (explaining, with approval, feminist objections to grand theory, yet defending
Catharine MacKinnon's grand theory as politically useful); Frances Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (challeng-
ing dichotomous thinking and embracing androgyny as a goal that allows for multiplicity
and diffusiveness).
"' See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Differ-
ence, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 1, 7-9 (Deborah Rhode, ed,
1990); Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617 (1990).
"I See Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990);
Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115; Martha Minow, Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987).
' "If feminists largely share the pragmatist commitment that truth is hammered out
piecemeal in the crucible of life and our situatedness, they also share the pragmatist under.
standing that truth is provisional and ever-changing." Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragma-
tist and the Feminist 13 (manuscript available from author) (forthcoming in S. CAL. L. REV.
1990).
42 Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990).
"3 Id. at 644.
Cornell's emphasis on the significance of myth in constructing a concept of "woman"
reminds me of a remark Carolyn Heilbrun once made at a faculty workshop on writing
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peal to myth carries with it a call for collective imagining, in-
formed by women's realities, but not limited by them. Cornell's
"ethical feminism" offers us the possibility of building a shared
concept of "woman" that is always more than we are individually,
and thus is never limiting.
V. THE FUTURE
I have identified the four schools of feminist thought, or femi-
nisms. There are, of course, other ways to categorize these femi-
nisms.14 s Whatever the categorization, the boundaries are never as
fixed as the labels make them seem. And some feminists slip in
and out of the various categories.146 I chose to draw the lines as I
drew them to emphasize one aspect of the various feminisms: how
they see the category "woman" as she is presently constructed by
male society. Liberal feminists, according to my taxonomy, see
"woman" defined primarily as someone confined to the private
sphere.147 Radical feminists see her as man's sexual object. Cul-
tural feminists see her as caring and connected to others. Finally,
postmodern feminists see her as so overly-determined that she is
an absence, not a presence. 4"
These different perspectives reflect the variety of woman's expe-
rience. Since feminist theory is built from the real life experience
of real women, our theories will necessarily be varied if they are to
capture the breadth of that experience. Our theories are built to
address the harms that we see. But our theories must not divide
women's biographies at the University of Southern California Law Center. In response to a
female law professor's characterization of her life as unremarkable, Professor Heilbrun said:
But you are living an extraordinary life. It is extraordinary because you are not
living one of the stories that history has made available in this culture for fe-
male lives. You are not a wife. You are not a mother. Your story as a lesbian
and a professional woman is unique. You are creating a new story as you live it.
And that is not an easy thing to do.
See generally CAROLYN HEILBRUN. WTRTING A Woma.N's LIFE (1988).
I'l Rosemarie Tong, for example, makes the following classifications: liberal, Marxist, rad-
ical, psychoanalytic, socialist, existentialist and postmodernist. RoSEIARIE ToNG, supra note
101.
"' Martha Fineman, for example, tells me she identifies herself more as a socialist femi-
nist than a cultural feminist. Wendy Williams, although identified with liberal feminism,
nonetheless embraces the social construction thesis of radical feminism.
1"7 See Wendy Williams, First Generation, supra note 4.
' Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One in NEw FRENCH FEINISMS 99 (Elaine
Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds. 1981).
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us. They must not prevent us from seeing the harms that others
see.
Catharine MacKinnon warns that the proliferation of feminisms
"in the face of women's diversity" can be viewed as a ploy of lib-
eral pluralism.14 9 I do not believe, however, that the mere existence
of four (or more) feminisms places them in a pluralistic posture
against one another. We can acknowledge the diversity of women's
experience without adopting pluralism's neutral stance towards
each other's theories. My theory may be right for me and your the-
ory may be right for you, but neither theory is feminist if it ignores
the reality of the other's experience.
Wendy Williams has suggested that one's starting point for the-
ory is determined in part by "when and where we entered."' 15 0 It
should surprise no one that white, middle-class, college-educated
women looked around themselves and noticed that their sex pre-
vented them from equal access to the the public sphere. It should
surprise no one that mothers have looked around them and seen
the ways in which motherhood has shaped their lives.1 Lesbian
theorists speak from their experience as lesbians. 52 African-Ameri-
can theorists speak from their experiences of racial subordina-
tion.'65 Theorists who have been vicitms of sexual assault and
abuse have focused on these experiences in building theory.15 4
"9 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 10, at xii.
110 Wendy Williams, First Generation, supra note 4, at 110 (borrowing the phrase from
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER. THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND
SEX IN AMERICA (1984)).
"'1 See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN (1976); Martha Fineman, Dominant Dis-
course, supra note 124; Martha Fineman, Implementing Equality, supra note 124; Stepha-
nie Wildman, The Power of Women (Book Review), 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 435 (1990)
(reviewing CATHARINE MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 10).
I See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY (1978); MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY9
ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY (1983); AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); ADRIENNE RICH,
ON LIES SECRETS AND SILENCE (1979).
"' See, e.g., bell hooks, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK (1989);
AUDRE LORD, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersec-
tion of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Judy Scales-Trent, Commonali.
ties: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 290
(1990); Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 1 (1988).
" See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); Lynne Henderson, What Makes Rape a
Crime (Book Review), 3 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 193 (1987-88) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICII, REAL
RAPE (1987)); Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
81 (1987).
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What we experience shapes our view of the world. For feminist
theorists, our experiences as women shape our understanding of
male power. Our theories reflect that understanding. We begin
from where we stand. But none of the feminists I know claim to be
limited to theories derived solely from their own personal experi-
ence. Rather, feminist method entails access to a broader range of
women's experience.
Some feminists embrace consciousness raising as the paradigm
for feminist method. 55 Consciousness raising may be defined
broadly as a process whereby women listen to each other as we tell
our personal stories. Often these are stories that have never been
told before. They include stories that have been silenced by the
dominant discourse. Through consciousness raising, some women
gain knowledge of other women's experience and thus are able to
build theory that reflects a broad range of women's experience. In-
deed, the uncovering of previously-silenced stories has helped set
the agenda for much feminist action.15
I began this Essay with the observation that feminist legal theo-
rists have spent too much time debating equality and not enough
time debating the meaning of self-definition for women. The equal-
ity debate has at times assumed sub silentio varying definitions of
what "woman is" and what "woman should be." The equality de-
bate has also assumed sub silentio, at a minimum, that "woman"
is and, perhaps further that "woman" should be, a working defini-
tion or category for law.
I propose that, in the future, feminist legal theorists be more ex-
plicit about their understanding of what "woman is" and what
"woman should be."15 7 1 believe this conversation about the mean-
" See, e.g., CATHARINE NMAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINtsr THEORY, supra note 10; Chris-
tine Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes (Book Review), 41
STAN. L. REv. 751 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 2).
"' For example, Betty Friedan gave voice to many previously-silenced women who were
dissatisfied with their confinement to the private sphere and helped lead to legislation in-
tended to open the public sphere for women. BETTY FRiFDAN. THE FEa!,sNt- MYSTQUE
(1963). "Speak-outs" on sexual harassment made visible a harm that the law had ignored
and led to new legal interpretations of sex equality in the workplace. See CATHARINE MAcK-
INNON, SEXUAL HARRAsStENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
"I Richard Wasserstrom has written insightfully about the problem of confusing what
"is" with what "ought to be" in our conversations about equality. See RICHARD \VAssER.
STROM, Racism and Sexism, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES FivE STUDIES 11 (1980).
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ing of "woman" is, at least for the moment, much more important
to feminist theory than the development of any sort of abstract
equality theory. To have the conversation is to engage in the pro-
cess of self-definition. We must have the conversation before we
can conclude whether "woman," however defined, is a category
that ought to continue.
Some feminist legal theorists have already steered away from the
equality debate and focused more directly on the question of self-
definition. Robin West, in particular, has focused directly on the
meaning of "self" for feminist theorists, warning us to beware of
postmodernism's rejection of essentialism." 8 Ruth Colker's recent
work grapples with the meaning of authentic existence for
women.'59 And Drucilla Cornell encourages us to continue the
search for the feminine employing myth as a necessary part of the
process. 60 I believe this discussion of the meaning of self and ques-
tioning of who defines whom is a useful development for the future
of feminist legal theory.
The challenge I pose to feminist legal theorists is a challenge to
develop legal theories that will support the process of self-defini-
tion-theories that will support the conversation. By focusing on
the process of self-definition, I mean to suggest that we more fully
acknowledge the importance of feminist method in building our
substantive theories.
I have suggested that consciousness raising is the cornerstone of
feminist method. Consciousness raising is about giving voice to the
unknown in women's experience. Consciousness raising makes
available stories that are personal and private. Consciousness rais-
ing brings new understanding by making known the unknown. Le-
gal theories to support consciousness raising would include not
only theories that protect speech, but theories that encourage the
right kind of listening, a listening that privileges (temporarily) the
previously silenced.
Because we have learned that the lived realities of different
"5 See Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, supra note 128, at 59.
See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 128, at 1011;
Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of
Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REv. 217 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2).
"' Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, supra
note 142.
844 [Vol. 24:803
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 844 1989-1990
LIMITS OF EQUALITY
women are different, we need to pay attention to these differences
as we discuss the meanings of "woman" for the future of feminist
legal theory. Listening to other women is central to feminist
method. Taking what they say seriously is essential.' Listening to
what "is" in other women's lives contributes to my ability to un-
derstand what "ought to be." Debating what ought to be is differ-
ent from listening to what is. Feminist method can include debates
about what ought to be-debates about normative truths-but
those debates must recognize our incomplete understanding of
what is.
Katharine Bartlett's description of "positionality" explains the
connection between partial knowledge and truth and suggests how
we might see beyond our own positions of limited knowledge:
Truth is partial in that the individual perspectives that
yield and judge truth are necessarily incomplete ...
[T]he key to increasing knowledge lies in the effort to ex-
tend one's limited perspective .... My perspective gives
me a source of special knowledge, but a limited knowl-
edge that I can improve by the effort to step beyond it, to
understand other'perspectives, and to expand my sources
of identity. To be sure, I cannot transcend my perspec-
tive .... But I can improve my perspective by stretching
my imagination to identify and understand the perspec-
tives of others.162
I agree. Understanding and knowledge come from experience.
We increase our knowledge and we approach a more comprehen-
sive truth when we include perspectives that are derived from the
experiences of others along with our own. Feminist theorists have
made valuable contributions to law by adding a female perspective
to legal discussions. But feminist theorists should not privilege one
perspective over another. Our contributions are especially valuable,
not because we speak from a female perspective, but because we
speak from a previously-silenced perspective.
As we continue our conversations about the meaning of "wo-
"' "Taking all women seriously should mean respecting women's own conceptions of
themselves and their interests." Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, supra note 107, at
130-31.
"62 Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Hnav. L Rv. 829, 881-82 (1990).
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man," we need to resist the privileging of one woman's perspective
over another. We must pay special attention to those from whom
we differ most, because we are unlikely to have accepted their per-
spectives as much as our own. And we must remember that the
dominant discourse often silences those to whom we most need to
listen. ' Consider, for example, the plight of lesbians and gay men
who risk the loss of job and family by speaking the truth about
their lives. Imagine what it must be like to live a life in secret and
to construct a different truth for public view. How can we ever
hear all perspectives when society attaches such costs to speaking
the truth about one's self-definition?
For this reason, we should fashion feminist legal theories with a
view to uncovering the silences." 3 At the same time, these theories
should reflect our obligations to listen and to participate positively
in the construction of another's self-identity. Our theories must
not rely on definitions that limit another's self-conception. We
must be principled in our interactions with one another, yet we
must also be always open to the truth of the other's story.
Feminist method, as I conceive it, is about being in the world in
a way that embraces both our separateness and our connectedness
with others. 4 Similarly, self-definition is not solely an individual
enterprise grounded in our separation from each other, nor solely a
group project impervious to individual realities. Thus, we need to
build feminist legal theories that support the telling of our individ-
ual truths, as well as theories that protect the space we share with
others as we construct our identities. I believe it is time to recap-
ture from the patriarchy such principles as individual autonomy,0 0
163 See, e.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989) (arguing that courts ought to
strike down laws that penalize homosexuals so that we can speak and be heard in the politi-
cal process).
,' The "we" (our) in this sentence is intended to encompass men as well as women. I
believe the "separation thesis" and the "connection thesis" are both true for men and
women, although I can only say with authority that they are both true for me. For a further
discussion of the "separation thesis" and the "connection thesis" and a suggestion that the
"separation thesis" is male whereas the "connection thesis" is female, see Robin West,
supra note 125.
165
Today's feminists either do not discuss a theory of individuality or they unself.
consciously adopt the competitive, atomistic ideology of liberal individualism.
There is much confusion on this issue in . . . feminist theory .... Until a
conscious differentiation is made between a theory of individuality that recog-
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privacy,16 6 free speech,16 7 intimacy and association. 168
I agree with the postmodern insight that there is no single, uni-
tary definition of "woman." Indeed, it is precisely because there is
no single definition of "woman," that our conversations about the
meaning of "woman" become so important. I propose that we put
substantive theories (such as equality) to one side until we have
continued our conversations further. In the meantime, we might
turn our attention to substantive theories that will protect our
method.
nizes the importance of the individual within the social collectivity and the
ideology of individualism that assumes a competitive view of the individual,
there will not be a full accounting of what a feminist theory of liberation must
look like for Western society.
ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE RADIcAL FuTuRE oF LIBERAL FEMINIS M 5 (1981).
"' Privacy, as it has been constructed by male liberal theory, keeps the state out of indi-
vidua space in a way that privileges male power. Thus, Catharine MacKinnon criticizes
judicial reliance on privacy doctrine in the abortion decisions, because it leaves many
women privately pregnant with no access to needed abortions. See CATHARINE MACKINNON.
FEMsISNSM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2.
" The guarantee of free speech benefits those who have the power to draw listeners:
those with the greatest access to the market of ideas. The construction of "woman" is a
product of this market. Both government and corporate funding of speech, from National
Endowment for the Arts grants to television commercials, impact seriously on the concept of
"woman" in this society. We need a concept of free speech that recognizes existing inequali-
ties in power and re-conceives the role of the "state" in providing access to listeners.
"I Intimacy and association are values that need to be extended to protect those relation-
ships that are essential to our constructions of self. These include same-sex couples as well
as other relationships with non-biological families. See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of In-
timate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 635 (1980); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
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